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Synesthesia is a condition in which stimulation of one
sensory modality causes unusual experiences in a
second, unstimulated modality. Although long treated
asacuriosity, recent researchwithacombinationofphe-
nomenological, behavioral, and neuroimaging meth-
ods has begun to identify the cognitive and neural ba-
sis of synesthesia. Here, we review this literature with
an emphasis on grapheme-color synesthesia, in which
viewing letters and numbers induces the perception of
colors. We discuss both the substantial progress that
has beenmade in the past fifteen years and some open
questions. In particular, we focus on debates in the
field relating to the neural basis of synesthesia, includ-
ing the relationship between synesthesia and atten-
tion and the role of meaning in synesthetic colors. We
propose that some, but probably not all, of these dif-
ferences can be accounted for by differences in the
synesthetes studied and discuss some methodologi-
cal implications of these individual differences.
Introduction
Synesthesia is a relatively rare condition in which sen-
sory stimuli causeunusual additionalexperiences. These
additional experiences often occur between modalities,
such as seeing colors while listening to music or feeling
tactile shapes while tasting foods (Baron-Cohen and
Harrison, 1997; Cytowic, 1989). One of the most com-
mon, and intensely studied, forms of synesthesia is
grapheme-color synesthesia (Day, 2005), in which view-
ing letters or numbers elicits the experience of colors.
For our synesthete JAC, looking at the letter E will elicit
the experience of a red photism, or colored overlay, while
viewing an O elicits a blue percept. Other synesthetes re-
port that they do not actually see these colored photisms
but rather just ‘‘know’’ that a particular letter is a particu-
lar color, whereas still others report experiencing spe-
cific colors but say that the color is experienced some-
where within their ‘‘mind’s eye’’ (Dixon et al., 2004;
Flournoy, 1893; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b).
Although synesthesia was first investigated over one
hundred years ago (Galton, 1880a, 1880b, 1883), the study
ofsynesthesiahassincebeen largely treatedasacuriosity
in psychology and neuroscience (for a historical overview,
see Marks [1975]). Recently, this trend has reversed, and
a new generation of psychologists and neuroscientists
has begun to take notice of synesthesia (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b; Rich and Mattingley, 2002;
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on four major topics: (1) genetic, cognitive, and perceptual
studies that havebeen conducted in the pastfifteen years;
(2) neural models of synesthesia; (3) functional imaging
studies of synesthesia; and (4) the role of individual differ-
ences in explaining some of the apparently contradictory
results in the perceptual and neuroimaging literature.
Genetic Components of Synesthetic Experience
Early research demonstrated that synesthesia is a famil-
ial trait (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Galton, 1883) and sug-
gested that it is more common in women than in men
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1996), perhaps through an X-linked
dominant mode of inheritance (Bailey and Johnson,
1997). However, the exact genetic loci remain to be iden-
tified, and preliminary results from a molecular genetic
study of synaesthesia indicate that synaesthesia may
not be solely X linked (J.E. Asher, personal communica-
tion). When large-scale random sample studies are car-
ried out, there is no gender bias, suggesting that early
studies suffered from an underreporting by male sub-
jects (J. Simner, personal communication). Other recent
findings, including a pair of monozygotic twins who were
discordant for synesthesia (Smilek et al., 2002) and data
suggesting that synesthesia can skip generations (Hub-
bard and Ramachandran, 2003) are hard to reconcile
with dominant transmission. In sum, recent data suggest
that the genetic mechanisms underlying synesthesia
may be more complex than the straightforward X-linked
dominant account proposed by early researchers.
Similarly, the estimated prevalence of synesthesia has
varied dramatically, between as many as 1 in 20 (Galton,
1883) and as few as 1 in 25,000 (Cytowic, 1989). The most
widely cited study to date suggests that synesthesia
occurs in at least 1 in 2000 people (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1996), although this is now generally regarded as an
underestimate. Our own informal samples have sug-
gested that the prevalenceofgrapheme-color synesthesia
might be between 1 in 200 (Ramachandran and Hubbard,
2001b) and 1 in 100 (Mulvenna et al., 2004). Subsequent
large-scale studies have suggested that the prevalence
of synesthesia might be as high as 1 in 20 across all forms
and 1 in 100 for grapheme-color synesthesia (J. Simner,
personal communication). This high prevalence argues
against the notion that synesthesia is merely a ‘‘benign
cognitive variant’’ (see Ward and Mattingley, 2005) and
instead suggests that it is a widespread phenomenon
that may provide novel insights into the neural basis of
the mind (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b).
Test-Retest Consistency in Synesthesia
In addition to showing that synesthesia is a familial
trait, early behavioral studies indicated that individual
synesthetes are consistent across time in their color as-
sociations (greater than 90% consistent over test-retest
intervals of up to one year) and that their color associa-
tions tend to be highly specific (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1993, 1996; Mattingley et al., 2001). Recently, using a
‘‘Revised Test of Genuineness’’ (TOG-R), Asher et al.
(2005) have further demonstrated the reliability of
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ples that allow a quantitative measurement of the match
between testing sessions, they demonstrated that con-
sistency measures for synesthetes and controls formed
two distinct nonoverlapping populations. These mea-
sures thereby provide an objective method for identifying
synesthetes, although whether this should be treated
as a definitional feature or an associated one remains
open to debate (Ward and Mattingley, 2005).
Cognitive Studies of Synesthesia
Although studies of consistency are useful in differenti-
ating between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes, they
are too coarse to allow exploration of the cognitive, per-
ceptual, and neural bases of synesthesia. Consistency
tells us that there is some difference between synes-
thetes and nonsynesthetes, but it does not tell us ex-
actly what that difference is. In the past five years, there
has been an explosion of studies examining these ques-
tions with more sophisticated behavioral techniques.
With modified Stroop interference paradigms, recent re-
search has shown that synesthesia is automatic and
perhaps obligatory (Dixon et al., 2000; Lupian˜ez and
Callejas, 2005; Mattingley et al., 2001; Mills et al., 1999;
Odgaard et al., 1999; Wollen and Ruggiero, 1983). In
the standard Stroop paradigm, color names are pre-
sented in colored ink, such as the word RED printed in
either red or green ink (‘‘congruent’’ and ‘‘incongruent,’’
respectively). Responses in the incongruent condition
are typically much slower than in the congruent condi-
tion. Because the task has nothing to do with reading
the word, the interference shows that reading the word
is automatic (MacLeod, 1991).
Similarly, in the ‘‘synesthetic Stroop’’ paradigm, gra-
phemes are presented in either congruent or incongruent
ink colors for each synesthete. Fora synesthete who sees
7 as yellow, a 7 presented in yellow would be congruent,
and a 7 presented in any other color would be incongru-
ent. The consistent finding that synesthetes are slower in
the incongruent condition than in the congruent condi-
tion demonstrates that synesthetic colors are automatic
and not under voluntary control. Subsequent research
has shown that synesthetic Stroop interference can be
induced simply by thinking about or imagining the elicit-
ing stimulus when it is the solution to a math problem
(Dixon et al., 2000; Jansari et al., 2005) and can be elimi-
nated by masking the target grapheme before presenting
a colored grapheme (Mattingley et al., 2001). One open
question is the degree to which suppression of synes-
thetic colors is possible, as measured by negative prim-
ing (Lupian˜ez and Callejas, 2005; Odgaard et al., 1999).
Psychophysical Studies of Grapheme-Color
Synesthesia
Although Stroop interference demonstrates automatic-
ity, interference alone does not distinguish between per-
ceptual or conceptual processes (MacLeod, 1991) be-
cause it can be induced through trained associations
(Elias et al., 2003; MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988). To ad-
dress the question of whether synesthetic colors are per-
ceptual or conceptual, numerous groups have designed
perceptual experiments in which synesthetic colors may
be expected to either help or hinder performance, de-
pending on the exact design. Although the number ofparadigms has increased recently, the most extensively
utilized methods fall into two broad categories: search-
related and masking-related paradigms.
Search-Related Paradigms
The most commonly used strategy to test synthetic col-
ors is to adapt a visual search task. In our previous re-
search, we adapted a texture segregation task to pres-
ent subjects with displays in which one of four shapes
(4-AFC) composed of a target grapheme was embedded
in a background of distracter graphemes. In this task,
synesthetes were significantly more accurate than con-
trol subjects in identifying which of the target shapes
was presented (see Figure 1A). We initially tested two
synesthetes (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a) and
later expanded this sample to six synesthetes in an im-
proved design (Hubbard et al., 2005a). We find that, in
five out of six subjects, their synesthetic colors aid in
performance on this task, consistent with the idea that
synesthetic colors are evoked early in perceptual pro-
cessing.
In another early study, Smilek et al. (2001) report two
experiments that demonstrate that a number is harder to
identify and localize when the background color is con-
gruent with the synesthetic color than when it is incon-
gruent. For example, a ‘‘blue’’ 4 is detected faster when
presented against a red background than against a blue
background (Figure 1B). This interference effect also
suggests that synesthetic colors must be elicited at early
stages of perceptual processing in order for the color to
interfere with the detection of the target grapheme.
Subsequently, Palmeri et al. (2002) showed that syn-
esthetic colors can aid in the detection of a singleton
grapheme in a traditional visual search paradigm, in
which reaction times were measured as a function of
the number of distracters (Figure 1C). When synesthetic
colors differed between target and distracter (searching
for a 2 among 5s), their synesthetic subject was much
more efficient in his visual search. When the target and
distracter elicited similar colors (searching for a 6 among
8s), search was much less efficient. In control subjects,
no such difference was observed.
However, in another recent study, 14 synesthetes and
matched controls were tested on a visual search task
similar to that employed by Palmeri et al., but none of
them demonstrated parallel search (Edquist et al., 2005).
Two of the synesthetes showed a degree of perceptual
enhancement, but none of their subjects demonstrated
truly preattentive search functions. These results sug-
gest that previous results showing strong perceptual
pop-out may not be true of all synesthetes but rather
only a small proportion of synesthetes (see below).
Two other recent studies have suggested that the re-
lationship between attention and synesthesia may be
more complex than originally thought. Laeng et al.
(2004) tested a single synesthete in a synesthetic visual
search paradigm. When slopes were calculated as a
function of number of distracters, they found evidence
of improved search efficiency for the synesthete relative
to controls. However, when reaction times were ana-
lyzed as a function of eccentricity, the search time ad-
vantage occurred only for eccentricities of less than 10º,
suggesting that perceptual enhancement might occur
only within the ‘‘functional field of attention.’’ In another
variant of the visual search paradigm, Sagiv et al. (2005)
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(A) The left panel shows a representative screen shot illustrating stimuli and our rendition of what it may have appeared like for subject JAC. The
right panel shows behavioral performance for our six synesthetes. Control subjects (n = 20 per synesthete) are indicated by white bars, synes-
thetes by medium gray bars, and control subjects presented with colored displays (n = 20 per synesthete) by dark gray bars. Error bars indicate
the SEM (from Hubbard et al. [2005a]).
(B) A visual search paradigm in which the background could either be congruent or incongruent with the synesthete’s experienced colors. As can
be seen here, synesthete C shows a clear difference in her search performance as a function of background color, although no such difference
was observed for controls. Error bars indicate the SEM (adapted from Smilek et al. [2001]).
(C) Another visual search paradigm in which search for graphemes that elicited dissimilar colors (a 2 among 5s) was differentially improved com-
pared for a search for graphemes that elicited similar synesthetic colors (an 8 among 6s). Error bars indicate the SEM (from Palmeri et al. [2002]).
(D) Data showing that at least some of the improvement found in previous studies may come from faster rejection of distracters. In the upright
conditions (both target present and target absent), absolute search times were improved for synesthete AD, whereas no such difference was
observed for synesthete CP. Note that AD and CP in this panel are referred to as AAD and CHP in (A). Error bars indicate the SEM (adapted
from Sagiv et al. [2005]).presented two synesthetes with targets that elicited
synesthetic colors against a background of rotated let-
ters that did not induce synesthetic colors (Figure 1D).
In this ‘‘inverted’’ condition, they found no perceptual
enhancement in either of the two subjects, although
they found improved performance in synesthete CP
in the upright condition, suggesting that at least part of
the enhancement observed in early studies was due to
faster rejection of the distracters, rather than detection
of the target.
Masking-Related Paradigms
Studies of synesthesia have also used a variety of mask-
ing paradigms to explore the level at which synesthetic
colors are elicited. Using a crowding paradigm, we in-
vestigated whether synesthetic colors could aid in the
identification a peripheral target grapheme under condi-
tions where control subjects were unable to identify thetarget (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b). Graphe-
mes presented in the periphery are difficult to identify
when crowded by other, flanking graphemes, an effect
known as crowding (Bouma, 1970; He et al., 1996). This
effect is attenuated by presenting the target in a different
color than the flankers (Kooi et al., 1994). We originally
reported that two synesthetic subjects were significantly
better at identifying the target grapheme than controls
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b). However, subse-
quent research with a sample of six synesthetes demon-
strated that these effects may not generalize to all synes-
thetes (Hubbard et al., 2005a).
Contrary to these findings, Mattingley et al. (2001)
showed that synesthetic Stroop interference was elimi-
nated when conscious awareness of the grapheme
was eliminated by pattern masking (for critiques, see
Blake et al. [2005] and Smilek et al. [2005]). They tested
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Stroop paradigm, by presenting a forward pattern mask,
a target grapheme, and then a backward pattern mask
composed of six colored symbols that were either con-
gruent or incongruent with the synesthetic colors expe-
rienced by their synesthetes for the target grapheme.
The graphemes were presented for different durations
such that subjects either could (at 500 ms) or could not
(at 28 and 56 ms) identify the grapheme. When graphe-
mes were presented for 500 ms, a clear Stroop interfer-
ence was observed. However, when graphemes were
presented for 28 or 56 ms, no such interference was ob-
served.
However, Wagar et al. (2002) have shown that object
substitution masking, which occurs late in processing
(Enns and Di Lollo, 1997), does not eliminate the experi-
ence of synesthetic colors, even though it does elimi-
nate conscious recognition of graphemes in control sub-
jects. In a single synesthetic subject, C, the deleterious
effect of object substitution masking on identifying a
masked grapheme was much less than in any of their
eight control subjects. One important difference is that
recognition of graphemes seems to require focused at-
tention to bind the elements together, whereas color is
generally thought of as a basic feature (e.g., Triesman
and Gelade [1980]).
Potential Explanations of These Contradictions
Overall, these studies demonstrate the perceptual real-
ity of synesthetic colors; however, almost every pub-
lished study has been met by a counter study that pro-
duces apparently contradictory results with a different
group of synesthetes and a different paradigm. There
are at least three possible interpretations of these re-
sults. First, a growing body of evidence suggests that
there is substantial variability in synesthetes (Dixon
et al., 2004; Hubbard et al., 2005a; Smilek and Dixon,
2002) and that these differences are likely to account
for some of the conflicting results in the literature. We
suggest that the reality of substantial individual differen-
ces needs to be taken into consideration in evaluating
‘‘failures’’ to replicate or partial replications (see also
Dixon and Smilek [2005]). This is especially important
given that perhaps only 10% of synesthetes are ‘‘projec-
tor’’ synesthetes (Dixon et al., 2004), in whom we would
expect to find these low-level perceptual effects (see
below). The same synesthetes need to be tested with
different paradigms to determine whether some of the
contradictory results in the literature are due to individ-
ual differences between synesthetes or differences in
experimental paradigms.
To date, there is only one example where the same
synesthetes have been tested with the different para-
digms by different investigators. Four of the six synes-
thetes we tested with our behavioral and fMRI para-
digms (Hubbard et al., 2005a) have also been tested by
Sagiv and colleagues with ERPs (Sagiv et al., 2003),
and two of them have been tested by behavioral meth-
ods (Sagiv et al., 2005). In this case, data from several
paradigms (crowding task, fMRI BOLD signal, and ERP
signals; see below) correlated, whereas other measures
(the embedded figures task and visual search with ro-
tated distracters) did not (compare Figures 1A and 1D).
Despite the diverging conclusions these two studies
reached about the role of attention synesthetic visualsearch, the pattern of differences is stable between the
two studies, with AAD showing a greater behavioral ad-
vantage than CHP. Although these results suggest that
individual differences will not resolve all of the contra-
dictory results in the literature, until this is tested more
explicitly, it is premature to decide whether contradic-
tory results are due to differences in synesthetes, differ-
ences in testing methods, or some combination of both.
Second, even for those rare subjects in whom synes-
thetic colors occur relatively early in visual processing,
they may not be strictly preattentive. Paradigms that
test strict preattentive processing may fail to find effects
of synesthetic colors, whereas paradigms that test for
early visual processes, such as texture segregation, may
find effects of synesthetic colors (Treisman, 2005). This
may help to reconcile much of the contradictory litera-
ture by suggesting that although they are elicited early
in processing, synesthetic colors are not equivalent to
real colors in the external world. This is consistent with
our findings that synesthetic colors were not as effective
as real colors in enhancing performance on our embed-
ded figures and crowding tasks (Hubbard et al., 2005a).
Finally, it is possible that the dichotomous view of at-
tentional processes as either pre- or postattentive is too
simple, and synesthesia simply highlights the inadequa-
cies of the dichotomous distinction. Both psychophysi-
cal (Pashler, 1998; Wolfe, 1994) and neuroimaging stud-
ies (for a review, see Kastner and Pinsk [2004]) suggest
that attention may operate at multiple levels. We sug-
gest that some measure of distributed attention may be
required to elicit synesthetic experiences but perhaps
not the same degree required to bind highly confusable
letter segments. Future studies will have to investigate
the possibility that hybrid models of attention, such as
Guided Search (Wolfe, 1994), will better explain the ap-
parent contradictions in the psychophysical literature.
Neural Models of Synesthesia
Based on these and other results demonstrating the re-
ality of synesthetic experiences, it becomes natural to
speculate about its neural basis. To date, there have
been two, somewhat parallel discussions concerning
the neural substrate of synesthesia. The first of these
discussions has taken place at the neurophysiological
level and has centered on the question of whether synes-
thetic experience arises from a failure of neural pruning
or some form of disinhibition (compare Ramachandran
and Hubbard [2001a] and Grossenbacher and Lovelace
[2001]). The second discussion has taken place at the
architectural level. Three architectural models have
been proposed to date, which we will refer to here as
‘‘local crossactivation,’’ ‘‘re-entrant processing,’’ and
‘‘long-range disinhibited feedback.’’ These two orthogo-
nal questions might be best thought of as a two by three
table, illustrated in Table 1.
Despite their logical independence, not all combina-
tions of possible mechanisms have been proposed. Al-
though we have suggested that our model could involve
disinhibition of feedback, we have tended to think in
terms of excess anatomical connections, which are nor-
mally pruned in development (Hubbard and Ramachan-
dran, 2003; Hubbard et al., 2005a; Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001a, 2001b). At the other end of the spec-
trum, the long-range feedback theory tends to be
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513Table 1. Theories of the Neural Basis of Synesthesia
Local Crossactivation Re-Entrant Feedback
Anatomical connections Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a;
Hubbard et al., 2005; Maurer, 1997
Smilek et al., 2001 Armel and Ramachandran, 1999
Disinhibition Smilek et al., 2001 Grossenbacher, 1997; Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001
Along the rows are the neurophysiological mechanisms proposed to account for synesthesia, and the columns indicate the architectural ac-
counts. References in individual cells indicate representative publications that have advocated these positions.couched in terms of disinhibition of feedback (Grossen-
bacher, 1997; Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001), al-
though an unusual case of acquired synesthesia be-
cause of blindness might be due to axonal sprouting,
given the long time required for the emergence of this
form of synesthesia (Armel and Ramachandran, 1999).
Finally, re-entrant processing models are neutral as to
the possible low-level neurophysiological substrates
but could be reconciled with either excess connectivity
or with disinhibited feedback.
Local Crossactivation
Based on the fact that the visual word form area (VWFA;
for a review, see Cohen and Dehaene [2004]) lies adja-
cent to color processing region hV4 (Wade et al., 2002),
we have proposed that grapheme-color synesthesia
may arise from direct crossactivation between these ad-
jacent brain regions (Hubbard et al., 2005a; Ramachan-
dran and Hubbard, 2001a, 2001b). Our hypothesis builds
on previous work suggesting that phantom limb sensa-
tions may arise through cortical reorganization in ampu-
tees (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998; Ramachandran
et al., 1992). Crucially, these cortical-to-cortical connec-
tions led to systematic perceptual experiences of having
the missing limb stimulated through stimulation of the
still-present facial nerves, and these novel perceptual
experiences were reproducible and involuntary. We sug-
gest that synaesthesia arises through a mechanism of
crossactivation similar to that observed in phantom
limb patients, and this crossactivation leads to repro-
ducible, involuntary, systematic perceptual experiences
(Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2003).
One potential mechanism for this would be the ob-
served prenatal connections between inferior temporal
regions and area V4 (Kennedy et al., 1997; Rodman
and Moore, 1997). In the fetal macaque, approximately
70%–90% of the connections are from higher areas (es-
pecially TEO), whereas in the adult, approximately 20%–
30% of retrograde-labeled connections to V4 come from
higher areas (Kennedy et al., 1997). If a genetic mutation
were to lead to a failure of pruning of these prenatal
pathways, connections between the VWFA and hV4
would persist into adulthood, leading to the experience
of color when viewing numbers or letters (see also
Baron-Cohen et al. [1993] and Maurer [1997]). Although
being adjacent to each other increases the likelihood
of brain regions being connected to each other, we sug-
gest that it is the presence or absence of such early con-
nections that is important, not the fact that brain regions
are adjacent per se.
Long-Range Disinhibited Feedback
Other studies have suggested that synesthesia may
be due to disinhibited feedback from a ‘‘multisensory
nexus’’ such as the temporo-parietal-occipital junction(Armel and Ramachandran, 1999; Grossenbacher, 1997;
Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). One piece of evi-
dence in favor of the long-range model comes from the
study of a patient, PH, who became blind at the age of
40 because of retinitis pigmentosa (Armel and Rama-
chandran, 1999). After a period of 2 years of blindness,
PH began reporting that tactile stimuli elicited the sub-
jective impression of seeing visual movement. Interest-
ingly, the intensity of the tactile stimulation required to in-
duce synesthetic photisms was greater when his hand
was held in front of his face than when it was held behind
his face, suggesting some sort of top-down multisensory
activation, perhaps mediated by parietal structures.
Another piece of evidence in favor of the disinhibited
feedback theory is that at least some people report
synesthetic experiences while under the influence of
psychedelics (see e.g., Shanon [2002]). However, the
experiences of congenital synesthetes, despite some
superficial similarities with the experiences in drug-
induced synesthesia, may arise from different mecha-
nisms (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2003). In particular,
the experiences of congenital synesthetes are typically
generic (Cytowic, 1989), whereas the experiences gen-
erated by psychedelics are often complex (Shanon,
2002). Similarly, the effects of psychedelics tend to be
systemic, whereas congenital synesthesia typically in-
volves highly precise mappings (like the letter A being
a very specific shade of red). In the absence of some
mechanism to account for these phenomenological dif-
ferences, we find it difficult to see how congenital and
drug-induced synesthesia could arise from a common
mechanism.
Re-Entrant Processing
Finally, something of a hybrid model has been sug-
gested (Myles et al., 2003; Smilek et al., 2001), in which
grapheme-color synesthesia has been suggested to
be due to aberrant re-entrant processing (perhaps con-
sistent with models of disinhibited feedback). Smilek
et al. propose that in addition to the forward sweep of
activity from V1 to V4, to posterior and then anterior
inferior temporal regions (PIT and AIT, respectively), ab-
errant neural activity from AIT feeds back to representa-
tions in PIT and V4, leading to the experience of synes-
thetic colors. The main evidence used to argue in favor
of this theory over the crossactivation theory is the
fact that visual context and meaning influence the expe-
rienced colors in synesthesia (Dixon and Smilek, 2005;
Myles et al., 2003; see also Ramachandran and Hubbard
[2001b] and Rich and Mattingley [2003]).
However, the presence of behavioral top-down mod-
ulations cannot distinguish between the local cross-
activation and re-entrant models of synesthesia be-
cause neither model has been specified with sufficient
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visual system (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991); the
main difference between the models is how feedback
is thought to modulate synesthetic colors. To account
for the presence of contextual modulations, the re-
entrant model suggests that neural signals propagate
back to V4 (labeled 1 in Figure 2A), and in parallel, this
activation influences the recognition of the grapheme
in PIT thereby leading to the influence of meaning on
synesthetic colors. The crossactivation model can ac-
count for these contextual modulations by assuming
that the same feedback mechanisms that are already
present, and that can account for top-down modula-
tions in nonsynesthetic observers (McClelland and Ru-
melhart, 1981), are also present in synesthetes. Once
those mechanisms are in place, activation from AIT
can directly bias the firing of neurons in PIT, such that
the responses of these neurons differ. The different pat-
tern of PIT (VWFA) neuronal firing will crossactivate a dif-
ferent population of V4 neurons, leading to both the per-
cept of a different grapheme and a different synesthetic
experience (labeled 2 in Figure 2B).
Multiple Neural Mechanisms
Of course, these proposals are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. One instructive lesson may come from stud-
ies of phantom limbs, in which a similar debate between
‘‘unmasking’’ and ‘‘sprouting’’ occurred (see Ramachan-
dran and Hirstein [1998] for a review). In some cases,
phantoms sensations are experienced less than 24 hr
after amputation, implying the unmasking of existing,
previously inhibited connections (Borsook et al., 1998).
However, longitudinal studies of amputees show that
the organization of the point-to-point correspondence
between facial trigger zones and phantom limb sensa-
tions in the arm develops slowly after amputation, sug-
gesting the development of new neural connections
Figure 2. Mechanisms whereby Feedback Could Affect Synesthetic
Colors
In (A), suggested by Smilek et al. (2001), meaning (processed in AIT)
directly influences synesthetic colors via direct feedback connec-
tions to V4 (circle 1). In (B), as suggested here, meaning indirectly in-
fluences synesthetic colors, only after it has biased form analysis in
PIT (circle 2).(Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). A similar interplay
between preserved connectivity and disinhibited feed-
back may be present in synesthesia, leading to the ob-
served mixture of occasional synesthetic effects in the
general population and the specificity of the experien-
ces of congenital synesthetes.
Different Neural Mechanisms for Different
Synesthetes
Another possibility is that a ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach
may fail to capture the variability in synesthetic experien-
ces. Different neural theories have focused on different
types of synesthesia, with the local crossactivation and
re-entrant feedback theories focusing on grapheme-
color synesthesia, whereas the feedback models have
focused on word-color and tone-color synesthesia. It is
quite likely, given that graphemes, phonemes, music,
and colors are processed by different brain regions,
that forms of synesthesia have different architectural
substrates. However, the fact that synesthetes within
the same family may inherit different forms of synes-
thesia (Ward and Simner, 2005) suggests that common
neurophysiological mechanisms may be shared across
different forms of synesthesia.
Functional Imaging Studies
Although there have been numerous neuroimaging
studies of synesthesia, they have yielded somewhat in-
consistent results. Using PET, Paulesu et al. (1995) pre-
sented word-color synesthetes with blocks of either
pure tones or single words. In this study, areas of the
posterior-inferior temporal cortex and parieto-occipital
junction—but not early visual areas V1, V2, or V4—
were activated during word listening more than during
tone listening in synesthetic subjects, but not in con-
trols. In a follow-up fMRI study, Nunn et al. (2002) tested
six female, right-handed, word-color synesthetes and
six matched nonsynesthetes. They report that regions of
the brain involved in the processing of colors (V4/V8) are
more active when word-color synesthetes hear spoken
words than when they listen to tones, but not earlier
visual areas such as V1 or V2. No such difference was
observed in control subjects, even when they were ex-
tensively trained to imagine specific colors for specific
words. In a case study of a synesthete who experiences
person-color synesthesia, hearing names that elicited
synesthetic colors led to activity in left extra-striate cor-
tex (near V4), but not V1 (Weiss et al., 2001). Another
case study of a word-color synesthete reports activation
of anatomically defined V1 but the authors were unable
to determine if V4 was active (Aleman et al., 2001). Yet
another recent study failed to find increased activation
in the fusiform gyrus during synesthetic experiences
but did find enhanced activity in the intraparietal sulcus
(Weiss et al., 2005), a region thought to be crucial for
binding of color and form (Robertson, 2003).
In sum, most studies of synesthesia suggest that
color-selective region V4 is involved in synesthetic col-
ors, but the functional significance of this activation, and
the degree to which other areas are involved, remains
unclear. These conflicting results may be due to meth-
odological differences between the studies, differences
between synesthetes studied, or differences in the
strength of the colors experienced by the different syn-
esthetes. To investigate this question, we obtained both
Review
515Figure 3. FMRI Data from Representative
Control and Synesthetic Subject
Ventral view of two inflated brains, with hV4
indicated in purple and the grapheme area in-
dicated in blue. Data from the synesthete and
the control both show activation in the graph-
eme region. In addition to the grapheme acti-
vation, the synesthete shows clear activation
of hV4, which is absent in the control subject.
For details see Hubbard et al. (2005a).behavioral and fMRI measurements in six grapheme-
color synesthetes and six nonsynesthetic controls to
test the hypotheses that (1) grapheme-color synesthesia
arises as a result of activation of color-selective region
hV4 in the fusiform gyrus and (2) the behavioral improve-
ments seen in our psychophysical paradigms are medi-
ated by this activation in hV4 (Hubbard et al., 2005a). In
our behavioral experiments, described above, we found
that a subject’s synesthetic experience can aid in tex-
ture segregation and reduce the effects of crowding.
We then used standard fMRI retinotopic mapping tech-
niques to identify individual visual areas in six synes-
thetes and controls. When presented with white on gray
letters and numbers, compared against nonlinguistic
symbols that did not elicit colors, we observed larger
fMRI responses in hV4 in synesthetes compared with
control subjects (Figure 3). Importantly, we found a pos-
itive correlation within subjects between the behavioral
and fMRI results (Figure 4). Subjects with better perfor-
mance in the behavioral experiments showed larger
fMRI responses in early retinotopic visual areas (V1,
V2, V3, and hV4). Importantly, the variability we ob-
served here is not purely random noise. Rather, our be-
havioral crowding task correlates not only with our em-
bedded figures task but also with our fMRI responses
Figure 4. Correlation between Behavioral Performance on the
Crowding Task and fMRI Responses in hV4
Filled symbols indicate synesthetic subjects, whereas open sym-
bols indicate control subjects. As can be seen here, synesthetes
showed substantial variability in both behavioral and performance
and fMRI response. Controls, on the other hand, performed univer-
sally poorly and showed overall lower responses in hV4 (from Hub-
bard et al. [2005a]).measured in hV4 and ERP measurements collected on
a subset of the subjects tested here. The stability of
these differences across different paradigms argues
for stable individual differences, which may help to ex-
plain some of the contradictory results in the literature.
Another recent study measured fMRI BOLD re-
sponses in four synesthetes in retinotopically defined
V1–V4 to graphemes that elicited synesthetic colors ver-
sus those that did not (Sperling et al., 2005). Overall, they
found greater activation in V4 when synesthetes were
presented with graphemes that caused them to report
seeing colors than when presented with graphemes
that did not. Interestingly, Sperling et al. report a hint
of individual differences but in the opposite direction
from what we find. Those synesthetes that report the
most spatially localized photisms showed less activa-
tion than those who reported diffuse photisms. How-
ever, unlike our study in which we restricted our analysis
to only voxels that responded to the same retinal loca-
tion where stimuli were presented, Sperling et al. mea-
sured responses across the entire retinotopic region,
raising the possibility that a few highly active voxels
were averaged with many other nonactive voxels for
those synesthetes who report strong focal experiences,
leading to a reduced mean response in those subjects
with the most localized photisms.
Activation of Early Retinotopic Areas in Grapheme-
Color Synesthesia
Our behavioral and fMRI results suggest not only that
synesthetic colors affect behavioral performance in a
manner similar to real colors but also that they also
activate color-selective regions of cortex in a manner
similar to real colors. As mentioned above, we find that
across subjects, improved psychophysical performance
is positively correlated with fMRI responses in retino-
topic visual areas, including hV4. Although this brain-
behavior correlation did not reach significance in early
visual areas, such as V1 and V2, it is interesting to note
that subjects that showed the greatest behavioral per-
formance in our crowding task also showed the greatest
degree of activation in these early visual areas. These re-
sults are consistent with three alternative proposals.
First, these results could be due to increased specific-
ity of color processing in the ventral visual stream, con-
sistent with models of color processing that suggest an
Neuron
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from V1 blobs through V2 thin stripes to V4 (Livingstone
and Hubel, 1984, 1987; Tootell et al., 2004). Alternatively,
it could be that the neural mechanisms of synesthesia
involve two components: local crossactivation between
grapheme regions and hV4 and top-down feedback
pathways with early visual areas. If so, the increased ac-
tivation in V1 (presumably mediated by feedback path-
ways) might be important for explaining the synesthetic
performance observed here. In synesthetes who were
experiencing more highly spatially localized photisms,
the degree of target localization (and corresponding be-
havioral performance) would increase, consistent with
the idea that V1 may serve as a high-resolution buffer
for spatial information in perception (Lee et al., 1998)
and imagery (Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). Finally, it
must be noted that the strength of the synesthetic ex-
perience (presumably elicited in hV4), which varied be-
tween synesthetes, might evoke differential attention to
the synesthetic colors, which would itself activate V1
(Gandhi et al., 1999; Martinez et al., 1999). Unfortunately,
given the temporal resolution of current techniques,
these are questions that cannot be answered definitively
with our data. Future studies will need to examine these
questions more precisely.
Uni- or Bidirectional?
Related to the question of feedback is the question of
whether synesthesia is uni- or bidirectional. Although
conscious synesthetic experiences are manifestly unidi-
rectional (e.g., from numbers to colors) (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2003), two recent studies have investi-
gated the question of whether there might be some bi-
directionality in synesthetic activation, even if it is insuf-
ficient to reach conscious awareness (Cohen-Kadosh
et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2005). Cohen-Kadosh et al.
took advantage of the numerical distance effect, in
which numbers that are far apart (large magnitude differ-
ence) are responded to more quickly than numbers that
are close together, and a synesthetic congruity effect.
By presenting a pair of numbers that are far in distance
but are presented in colors associated with a closer pair
of numbers (‘‘small color distance’’), responses should
be slowed in the synesthete group (but not the control
group) if numerical magnitude is automatically acti-
vated. Similarly, for pairs that are numerically close but
are presented in colors associated with a farther pair
(‘‘large color distance’’), responses should be facilitated
in the synesthete group but not the control group. In two
synesthetic subjects, responses were facilitated by
a large color distance in the small number condition
but were not interfered with by the small color distance
in the large number condition.
Although intriguing, further research will be required
to link these findings up with detailed neuroanatomical
models of synesthesia. For example, given that numeri-
cal magnitude information is represented in the region
of the left angular gyrus and bilateral IPS (see e.g.,
Dehaene et al., 2003), would these effects be found
only in ‘‘higher’’ synesthetes? Another question raised
by these findings is why synesthetic experience is uni-
formly unidirectional, despite the implicit bidirectionality
demonstrated here. Two possible explanations sug-
gest themselves. First, it may be that an object of somesort is required to bind the synesthetic experiences
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2003; Robertson, 2003).
For example, when a number evokes a color, there is
something in the visual image to which the color can
be ascribed. On the other hand, were a color to evoke a
number, the number may not be able to be represented
as a stimulus with physical properties of size, distance,
and the like. By using numerical tasks, the studies de-
scribed above may have provided an object for the acti-
vation to bind to, if only a cognitive one. Second, it may
be that the connections leading to synesthetic experi-
ence are of the appropriate strength or form to reach
conscious awareness, whereas the connections that
support bidirectional effects are not. How, and why, cer-
tain neural activity becomes conscious is being actively
investigated (Crick and Koch, 1998; Dehaene and Nacc-
ache, 2001). Competing proposals suggest that activity
reaches conscious awareness when activity in either
early sensory areas or in a global neural workspace ex-
ceeds a certain threshold. Future studies will be re-
quired to further clarify these issues.
Common or Special Mechanisms?
One final question is whether synesthesia depends on
mechanisms shared by everyone or whether it depends
on special mechanisms that are unique to synesthetes
(Blakemore et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2005). Ward et al.
have shown that tone-color associations share common
mechanisms with nonsynesthetic pitch-lightness asso-
ciations, replicating prior work (Hubbard, 1996; Marks,
1975). Based on this, they argue that synesthesia de-
pends on mechanisms of auditory-visual correspon-
dence common to us all not on pruning of neonatal
pathways (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. [1993]). Similarly,
Blakemore et al. (2005) have reported a case of synes-
thesia in which observed touches are experienced as
felt touches on the corresponding body part. Using
fMRI, they were able to measure activity in cortical net-
works related to the mirror neuron system involved in
self-other mapping. The synesthete showed activity in
the same regions as the nonsynesthetes but showed
greater activity in this network than any of the eight con-
trol subjects, leading Blakemore et al. to also suggest
that this form of synesthesia depends on mechanisms
present in us all but that they are active to a greater
degree.
As we have noted previously, the same mechanisms
present in synesthetes are likely to be present to a lesser
degree in nonsynesthetes and could account for the
‘‘conceptual rightness’’ of certain cross-sensory map-
pings, such as mapping a jagged visual shape with a
jagged sound (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b) or
associating high pitches with bright lights (Hubbard,
1996; Marks, 1975). Perhaps there is some degree of
pruning of perinatal pathways, but the degree of pruning
differs between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes (recall
that even in the normal adult macaque, the pruning is not
all or none). If the pathways are only slightly pruned,
the activity would be greater and, therefore, could enter
into conscious awareness. However, if the pathways
are heavily pruned only a residual activation may re-
main, which may be sufficient for establishing cross-
sensory mappings but insufficient to reach conscious
awareness.
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Based on our recent brain-behavior correlations and the
behavioral results by Dixon and colleagues, we argue
that the experiences of different synesthetes are sys-
tematically different (Dixon et al., 2004; Hubbard et al.,
2005a; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Smilek
and Dixon, 2002). Smilek and Dixon refer to differences
in the locus of the experienced colors as either ‘‘out in
space’’ or ‘‘in the mind’s eye,’’ which they term projector
and associator synesthetes, respectively. They show
that synesthetes grouped into the two different catego-
ries on the basis of self-report also show different pat-
terns of Stroop interference. Specifically, for projector
synesthetes, naming the color of the ink in which a
grapheme was presented induced greater Stroop inter-
ference than naming the photism color, whereas for as-
sociator synesthetes, the opposite pattern was ob-
served (Dixon et al., 2004).
We have proposed an alternative classification of
these synesthetes (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b;
Hubbard et al., 2005a), based not only on differences in
the experience of where the synesthetic concurrent is
experienced but also on the basis of differences in the
triggers, or inducers, of synesthetic experience. We sug-
gest that there might be two groups of synesthetes,
which we term ‘‘lower’’ (referring to lower perceptual pro-
cesses) and ‘‘higher’’ (referring to higher cognitive pro-
cesses) synesthetes, in whom the different forms of syn-
esthesia arise at different stages of processing. Much as
memory research gradually fractionated from a unified
concept of ‘‘memory’’ into the now widely accepted
‘‘multiple memory systems’’ view that allowed these pro-
cesses to be better tied to neural substrates (for a recent
historical review, see Squire [2004]), we believe that ad-
vances in understanding synesthesia will require a fur-
ther fractionation of our concepts of synesthesia.
Given the already existing neurocogntive models of
processes such as reading and numerical cognition,
two of the most common triggers of synesthetic experi-
ence, we may be able to predict what this deeper under-
standing of synesthesia will look like. The Dual-Route
Cascade model for reading (Coltheart et al., 2001) and
the Triple-Code model of numerical cognition (Dehaene,
1992; Dehaene et al., 2004) each contain less than a half-
dozen nodes, connected by approximately a dozen
pathways. By combining these models of synesthetic
triggers with the known neural basis of synesthetic con-
currents, we may be able to constrain potential neural
substrates of synesthesia to a small subset of these
nodes and thereby explain the individual differences ob-
served in synesthesia. Although we have previously fo-
cused on the neural substrates of numerical cognition
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b), our higher-lower
distinction shares much with the neurocognitive model
developed by Rich and Mattingley (2002) based on mod-
els of cognitive and neural processes involved in read-
ing. The main difference between these two proposals
is that we suggest different nodes as the site of crossac-
tivation for different synesthetes, whereas Rich and
Mattingley remain agnostic about potential subtypes
and their neural correlates.
If our hypothesis about the importance of adjacency is
correct, then we would predict that different classes of
inducers would lead to different classes of synestheticconcurrents. For example, perceptual processing of
graphemes may elicit strong, externally projected pho-
tisms, whereas processing of numerical concepts may
elicit internally experienced sensations of color. In lower
synesthetes, we suggest that crossactivation may occur
between adjacent regions of the fusiform gyrus involved
in letter recognition and color processing, whereas
higher synesthesia may arise from crossactivation in
the parietal cortex, particularly in the region of the angu-
lar gyrus, the ventral intraparietal area, and the lateral in-
traparietal area (Hubbard et al., 2005b). We suggest that
crossactivation in the region of the parietal lobe may ex-
plain synesthetic number forms, in which numerical (and
other ordinal sequences) are experienced as having
specific locations in space, in addition to colors (Hub-
bard et al., 2005b; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b).
One prediction of this model is that for lower synes-
thetes but not higher synesthetes, synesthetic color in-
tensity should be modulated by low-level visual proper-
ties of the inducer, such as contrast and font, which we
have recently observed in a single synesthete (Hubbard
et al., 2005). Crucially, this synesthete, JAC, performed
best in our psychophysical tasks and showed the great-
est activation of early visual areas in our imaging para-
digm (Hubbard et al., 2005a). Another prediction is that
different synesthetes should show different patterns
of fMRI and ERP responses. Recently, a late-blind syn-
esthete who experienced colors both for letters and
for months of the year was tested using fMRI (Steven
et al., 2005). When presented with Braille letters that eli-
cited synesthetic colors, activation was found in the
fusiform gyrus in the synesthete but not in a late-blind
control subject. In a second task, Steven et al. showed
that when (for example) ‘‘March’’ was used to refer to
months, it elicited increased activation in the region of
the angular gyrus, but not in the fusiform gyrus, in the
synesthetic subject. Similarly, preliminary ERP data
with a mismatch paradigm on four of the six synesthetes
tested by Hubbard et al. (2005a) further suggest qualita-
tive differences between synesthetes (Sagiv et al., 2003).
The earliest ERP differences mirrored the pattern of psy-
chophysical and fMRI responses observed in our study
(see Hubbard et al. [2005a] for details).
Finally, it should be noted that the extent to which the
projector/associator and lower/higher distinctions map
onto each other is an open empirical question. One pos-
sibility is that higher synesthetes would be more likely
to experience colors in their mind’s eye and, therefore,
demonstrate weaker perceptual effects. We would
therefore predict that higher synesthetes would be
more likely to be classified as associators. Another pos-
sibility is that the projector/associator distinction cap-
tures differences in the strength of experiences within
what we would refer to as lower synesthetes. It is even
possible that these dimensions are orthogonal, such
that there could be a ‘‘higher’’ synesthete with strong ex-
ternally projected photisms, although we consider this
unlikely. Additional research will be needed to answer
these questions.
Methodological Considerations
We would also like to comment briefly on the subject
of single-case versus group studies. These methodo-
logical questions are linked to the question of individual
Neuron
518differences because single-case approaches are more
likely to highlight differences, whereas group studies
are more likely to highlight commonalities. We believe
that synesthesia research can profit from using both
single-case and group approaches. However, we must
be cautious when interpreting the results of these ap-
proaches. Results from a single case may not generalize
to other synesthetes (especially given the rarity of some
of the stronger manifestations of synesthesia), and in-
deed, most of the studies that report strong synesthetic
effects have used a small number of self-referred synes-
thetes. However, a failure to find an effect in a group
study should be equally treated with caution. If a sample
is composed of several subtypes of synesthetes, the
variability in the sample may lead to a failure to find sig-
nificant results, such as in fMRI studies that use random
effects analyses. Similarly, if there is only one synes-
thete in a sample of ten who demonstrates the hypothe-
sized strong manifestations, then a group study will
miss a real but rare effect.
We used a third approach, which might best be
termed a ‘‘multiple-case study’’ approach, to demon-
strate that the positive results found for certain synes-
thetes were not simply statistical artifacts, observable
under specific circumstances with specific subjects
(Hubbard et al., 2005a). Rather, the differences we ob-
served were stable across two behavioral paradigms
and two brain-imaging techniques (our fMRI results
and the ERP results of Sagiv et al. [2003]). Given these
converging data showing the stability of these individual
differences, we believe that both generalizing from a lim-
ited sample or simply lumping all (superficially similar)
synesthetes together will lead to contradictory results
and failures to replicate (see also Dixon and Smilek
[2005]).
One final question raised by this focus on individual
differences is if projector or lower synesthetes are so un-
usual (Dixon et al., 2004), why were they so dispropor-
tionately represented in early studies of synesthesia?
One factor that may have brought them to researchers’
attention is just that unusualness. That is, because their
experiences were particularly strong, the synesthetes
were more aware of them and, therefore, were more
likely to approach researchers (see Palmeri et al.
[2002], Ramachandran and Hubbard [2001a], and Smi-
lek et al. [2001]). However, studies that recruit synes-
thetes from the population at large, such as the larger
studies of Mattingley and colleagues (2001), may include
a mixture of stronger and weaker synesthetes, leading
to the contradictory results discussed above.
Conclusions
Although the study of synesthesia has recently under-
gone resurgence, a great number of open questions
remain. In this review, we have focused on specific
questions concerning the behavioral consequences and
neural correlates of one form of synesthesia, grapheme-
color synesthesia. However, there are a number of other
questions that we do not have space to address here.
For example, other recent research has begun to ad-
dress the cognitive consequences of synesthesia for
creativity (Mulvenna et al., 2004) and memory abilities
(Mills et al., 2005; Smilek et al., 2002). These studies
have, to date, been conducted with small samples,and future research will be needed to determine how
general these findings are. Additionally, although much
of the current research has focused on grapheme-color
and tone-color synesthesia, there are many other forms
of synesthesia that are just beginning to be explored. We
believe that the crossactivation model may be able to
explain these other forms as well. For example, auditory
word to taste synesthesia may depend on crossacti-
vation between insular regions involved in taste pro-
cessing and superior temporal and/or frontal regions
involved in auditory word comprehension and produc-
tion (Ward and Simner, 2003), and feeling tactile shapes
in response to tastes (Cytowic, 1989) may arise from
cross-activation between insular regions and primary
somatosensory regions. The neural basis of other forms
of synesthesia, such as experiencing personalities for
letters and numbers or experiencing temperatures to
sounds, remains to be explored. We hope that our ex-
plorations into the neural basis of grapheme-color syn-
esthesia will also help to shed light on these other forms
of synesthesia.
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